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INTRODUCTION: THE REPUBLIC’S LEGAL
SYSTEM
In 1960 Cyprus was proclaimed an independent andsovereign republic. After independence the Englishlegal system and principles of equity and the common
law were maintained, while preserving civil law tradition in
family and administrative law. These are accompanied by
the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and laws
subsequently enacted by the House of Representatives.
The hierarchy of these laws is one area where difficulties
have been encountered vis a vis national and European law
(see R Ayres, “European integration: the case of Cyprus”,
Cyprus Review, 1996, pp 39-62). Following what has been
coined “the arrest warrant case”, and within the framework
of cooperative constitutionalism, EU law is now confirmed
as supreme and sitting above the constitution.
The Attorney-General is a party to all domestic legal
proceedings pursued against the republic, or by it, and
defends or institutes the proceedings in court, as the case
may be, through a counsel of the Law Office. Moreover all
prosecutions are instituted and conducted by the Attorney-
General and counsel of the Law Office acting under his
instructions (see A Neokleous, Introduction to Cyprus law,
New York, Yorkhill Law Publishing, 2000, p 27). 
With respect to mutual cooperation in criminal matters,
at first instance requests are dealt with by the District
Courts of which there are six (Nicosia, Famagusta,
Limassol, Larnaca, Paphos and Kyrenia). These decisions
can in certain circumstances be appealed to the Supreme
Court from which there is no further appeal.
Judges in Cyprus are appointed after working as a qualified
lawyer. There is no judicial training school in Cyprus, with
the responsibility falling on the Supreme Court. 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS: THE PRESENT
Mutual recognition in general
In general, the principle of mutual recognition, as a
successor to the ineffective mechanisms of mutual legal
assistance, is respected and well established in Cyprus law
(see H Xanthaki, “Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters: the Puzzle Revealed” 8 [2006] 2 Special Issue on
EU criminal law, European Journal of Law Reform, pp 175-
98). The republic fully adopted all relevant Framework
Decisions within the set time limits, and  does not require
reciprocity between Member States as a prerequisite for
mutual recognition implementing measures. Also, mutual
recognition of final judgments is not viewed differently
from mutual recognition of pre-trial decisions. 
Moreover, the republic chose to proceed with the
express transposition of the general provision on
fundamental rights which refers to Article 6 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU) in the national implementing
measures on mutual recognition as a means of clear and
categorical reassurance of the EU and other Member States
that Article 6 TEU applies. This was undertaken despite
the doubtful legal value of the provision in practice: after
all in Cypriot law human rights issues apply even where
there is no express provision in the relevant instrument.
Furthermore, Cyprus made a big compromise in agreeing
to the inclusion to some instruments (such as the
Framework Decision on the transfer of prisoners) of the
territoriality clause enabling a member states  to refuse to
recognise and execute a decision issued for an offence
wholly or partly committed on its territory. Cyprus
disagreed with that provision for three main reasons: its
antithesis to the Cypriot Constitution, to the essence of the
principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust, and to
the scope of the instrument on the transfer of prisoners
which was after all the rehabilitation of the convicted. 
In addition to the above, Cyprus has had to set aside
procedural differences in the recognition and execution of
decisions between its common law system and the
continental system of many EU Member States: so far few
difficulties in recognising and execution of decisions have
been encountered. An example demonstrating this point
can be drawn from judgments in absentia: although these
are provided for in Cypriot law in exceptional and rare
circumstances, the republic did not view this as an obstacle
for Cyprus’s acceptance of the Framework Decision (FD)
on judgments in absentia. Further evidence of this positive
approach can be found in the religious transposition of
mutual recognition instruments into Cypriot law. Thus, the
provisions on dual criminality are transposed exactly in the
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way they are worded in the Framework Decision on the
European arrest warrant (EAW), where it is practically
retained. Similarly, the provisions on the territoriality
clause are transposed in exactly the manner that they are
worded in the Framework Decision on the EAW.
Nevertheless, mutual recognition in Cyprus should not
be viewed as an absolute right. Firstly, the reference to the
fundamental rights in the mutual recognition instruments
(Art 1 (3) of FD 13 June 2002, Art 1 of FD 22 July 2003,
Art 3 of FD of 24 February 2005, p 8) implies that a
control should be exercised by the executing authority
(grounds for refusal) on the procedural safeguards and the
respect of the rights of defence in the issuing Member
States, especially if the issue is raised by the defence. This
concern is shared by others: (see S Alegre and M Leaf,
“Mutual recognition in European judicial cooperation: a
step too far too soon? Case study – the European arrest
warrant”, European Law Journal, 2004, pp 200-17).
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the Cypriot
Constitution sets commonly underestimated limits to the
transposition and implementation of the principle of
mutual recognition. Although in practice the republic
ensures that the relevant instruments are adopted fully,
even in contradiction of the constitution which has in the
past been amendedto allow for the surrender of own
nationals under the EAW, limits have been placed with
reference to the date of commission of the offence for
which a person is wanted. The need for these limits, which
are not unique in the EU,  refer to Parliament’s view that
otherwise there would be retrospective application of the
implementing law on the EAW, which would be contrary to
the constitution. In fact, the fifth amendment of the
Cypriot constitution provides that no provision of the
constitution shall be considered as annulling laws, acts or
measures taken by the republic in compliance with its
obligations as a Member State of the EU. 
Moreover, based again on constitutional grounds, double
criminality is considered an additional ground for refusal
(see V Mitsilegas, “The  constitutional implications of
mutual recognition in criminal matters matters in the EU,”
Common Market Law Review, 2006, pp 1277-1311). Thus,
the republic requested the inclusion of paras (3) and (4) in
Article 10 of the Framework Decision on alternative
sanctions. Under Article 10, for offences not covered by
paragraph 1 the executing state may make the recognition
of the judgment, the probation decision, and the
supervision of probation measures and of alternative
sanctions subject to the condition that the judgment relates
to acts which also constitute an offence under the law of
the executing state, whatever its constituent elements or
however it is described. 
Furthermore, the republic took additional measures in
its implementation of the EAW in order to ensure that
transposition would not create a vacuum: the
implementing law on the EAW provides that it applies only
between Cyprus and the Member States of the EU which
also have fully implemented the Framework Decision on
the EAW; as a result, countries that have properly, in
accordance with the Framework Decision declared that
they would execute an EAW only in relation to acts
committed after the set date, the European Convention on
Extradition can still apply in relation to those acts. Also,
the implementing law provides that extradition requests
received before the operation of this law are handled in
accordance with the previous regime (the European
Convention on Extradition). In addition to these points, it
is noteworthy that in the implementing legislation of the
Framework Decision on the EAW surrender may be
refused if the persons are wanted for their fight for
freedom; however, the provision has been criticised and
the republic is in the process of bringing a Bill before the
House of Representatives for its deletion.
But, do nationals and residents receive a particular status
in the relevant national implementing measures of EU
instruments on mutual recognition? In principle, all EU
citizens enjoy the same status. However, in the case of the
EAW, nationals and residents receive the status provided in
the Framework Decision on EAW except for the fact that
they can only be surrendered for actions committed after
Cyrus acceded to the EU. 
The European Arrest Warrant
The EAW is at the centre of the developing EU criminal
justice and embodies many of the principles, including
mutual recognition. Thus, the implementation of the EAW
is a good example of how Cyprus has embraced the EU
Criminal Justice mechanisms. The EAW Framework
Decision (2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States) was
implemented by Law No 133(I) of 2004 on the European
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures of Required
Persons. On the whole its transposition is regarded as a
success, as the Commission’s report on the
implementation of the FD since 2005 confirms (11 July
2007, COM92007) final).  
There are few departures from the Framework Decision,
and where they exist they tend to extend the scope or
purpose of the Decision. For example, in relation to the
mandatory reasons for non-execution of an EAW in the
interests of constitutional compatibility and protection of
human rights, Article 13 of the Law goes beyond what is
required under Article 3 of the Decision. It states:
(d) if the European arrest warrant has been issued for the
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the
grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin,
nationality, language, political opinions,  sexual
orientation or activity for  freedom, 
(e) if the person who is the subject of the European arrest
warrant, for the execution of custodial sentence or 3
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detention order, is a national and the Republic of
Cyprus undertakes the obligation to execute the
sentence or detention order according to its criminal
laws,  
(f) if the person who is the subject of the European arrest
warrant for his prosecution is a national, unless it is
ensured that after being heard, he or she shall be
transferred to the Republic of Cyprus, in order to serve
a custodial sentence or a detention order which shall be
passed against him/her in the issuing State of the
warrant.
The report of the Commission on the implementation
of the EAW (6815/05 ADD 1 COPEN 42) notes that the
reference to “action in favour of freedom” in Article 13(d)
of the Law was wider, creating a risk that a refusal will go
beyond the Decision. As a result of this a proposal was put
before the Parliament to delete this reference.
The central authority for issuing and executing EAWs is
the Ministry of Justice and Public Order. Within this
framework, the key actors include the police force, the Law
Office of the Republic of Cyprus and the District Judges. In
addition to the human rights guarantees inserted above,
there are good pre-trial procedural guarantees in place. For
example those arrested have the right to both a legal counsel
and interpretation, importantly as of right and practice. 
It is worth pondering the practical steps taken in the
issuance and the execution of an EAW. As a first step the
police must present the case to the Attorney-General who
will give an opinion on whether an EAW should be issued.
The police will then draft the proposed warrant and
present it to the Attorney-General for a decision. The
decision will be based on the proportionality principle, the
seriousness of the offence, the situation of the victim, and
the date of the offence. The Attorney-General will also
ensure that the EAW is drafted correctly. 
The EAW, domestic arrest warrant and any evidence is
then presented before a District Judge, which he will sign if
satisfied they comply with the law. Once issued, the EAW is
transmitted by the police to Interpol Nicosia and the central
authority who will then transmit to the receiving authority.
This procedure acts as a double check ensuring that
procedural mistakes/omissions in issued EAWs are avoided,
as is the issue of triviality existing in many of the other
Member States. Such a process will appear cumbersome to
many of the larger Member States who are currently
struggling to execute EAWs within the set time limits. 
However, when it is considered that the purpose of the
Decision is to promote cross border interaction between
authorities and in particular peer interaction between the
judiciary, in practice this is not fulfilled, despite the clear
law set out in the Decision as well as Article 8 of the Law,
which states that a District Judge may transmit the
incoming EAW directly to the executing judicial authority.
The judiciary themselves also appear reluctant to
communicate with other judges for clarification. This
reluctance is largely based on the perceived role of a judge
in the common law setting. A possible resolution to this
could be the creation of a network of judges focused on the
EAW and mutual recognition in criminal matters. 
The EAW, whilst transposed under law distinct to the
domestic arrest warrant, it is still very much connected. It
is understandable that for outgoing requests a domestic
arrest warrant needs to be issued as a first step and only
after the evidence indicates that the person is found abroad
is an EAW issued. However such a requirement for the
execution of an EAW goes against the spirit of the
Decision; for incoming requests a domestic arrest warrant
needs to be issued before a person can be arrested under
an EAW. Whilst this means that the procedures and
procedural guarantees in place for domestic arrest
warrants are of equal applicability for EAWs, it could also
lead to problems in the future.
The existence of a centralised database, the STOP-LIST,
helps ensure the avoidance of duplicitous warrants.
Looking to the future it will be interesting to see how this
database is coordinated with the Sirene Bureau set up as
part of the Schengen Information System (SIS), as well as
whether access will be granted to Customs and MOKAS.
The problems encountered to date by Cyprus are best
illustrated through consideration of the case law on the
issues. The first case is Scattergood v Attorney-General,
12/2005, 21 January 2005, in which Scattergood, who
had pleaded guilty in a UK court to two charges of
conspiring to import illicit drugs and was released on a
recognisance. His return from Cyprus was being sought by
the UK. His lawyer argued that his client had been arrested
following the issuing of an arrest warrant in violation of
Article 11 of the constitution, since it was based on
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law and not on
provisions of the Law for the European Arrest Warrant
–Law No 133 (1)/2004. The Supreme Court rejected that
argument, noting that the issuing of an arrest warrant by a
court in Cyprus is not a sine qua non condition for
jurisdiction by the Courts in Cyprus. The jurisdiction of a
court in Cyprus emanates from the EAW itself because, by
virtue of Article 3 of the Law No 133(1)/2004, it is an
order of a judicial authority of the EU Member State that
is issued in the context of a criminal procedure for the
purpose of having the requested person arrested and
handed over to the issuing state. 
Scattergood also submitted that his life would be in
danger if returned to the UK because he had been willing
to appear as a prosecution witness against his co-accused.
It was asserted that this was no longer an issue since he was
not going to be a witness. The Supreme Court first
considered the obligation of a state to protect a requested
person not only from acts of the state but also from the acts
of private persons, stating that where the danger posed is a
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, given the absolute4
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character of the provision, serious consideration must be
given to the allegations.  
After examining the facts of the present case, the court
concluded that the appellant would not be in any greater
danger in the United Kingdom than he would be in
Cyprus. The appeal was rejected and the individual
surrendered.
In the case of Ovakimyan v Attormey-General, 266/2005, 19
September 2005, the District Court of Limassol ordered
the implementation of the EAW issued by the Dutch
authorities against the appellant. The appeal to the
Supreme Court was based on two issues. Firstly that
competence for issuing EAW cannot be granted to Public
Prosecutors under the Framework Decision. On this issue
the Supreme Court held that under Dutch law the Public
Prosecutor, although operating under the responsibility of
the Ministry of Justice, constitutes part of the judicial
authority. Further, the competent authority for the issuing
of an EAW does not need to be a judge but can also be a
Public Prosecutor as allowed under Dutch law and that it
was up to each Member State to decide how to give effect
to a Framework Decision which states that  is to be issued
by a “judicial authority.”
Secondly, there was an assertion that the EAW was not
properly issued. Whilst an original was not sent, the
English translation was also signed by a second individual
and not the authorising public prosecutor. The Supreme
Court rejected these arguments finding that the whole
administrative and judicial procedure operated reasonably
within the spirit of Article 10 (4) (5) of the Framework
Decision and of Articles 4 and 8 (4) (5) of the Law. The
appeal was rejected.
The next case is that of Attorney-General v Konstantinou,
294/2005, 7 November 2005,  where the surrender of a
dual British and Cypriot national was requested by the UK
from Cyprus under an EAW. Here the Supreme Court
considered within the context of the prohibition on
extraditing its own nationals, firstly whether the EAW Law
was implemented contrary to the constitution, and secondly
the relationship between the constitution and EU law.
The unanimous decision held that Article 11 of the
constitution included an exhaustive list of reasons as to
when a person can be arrested, which did not include for
the purposes of an EAW and quoting its previous judgment
in Georgiou v Director of Central Prisons (1991) which
confirmed the constitutional prohibition of extraditing its
own nationals. Further it ruled that the correct legal
procedure should be followed to ensure that the EAW is
implemented into Cypriot law:
This case led to a Constitutional amendment with Article11
now reading:
“Arrest or withholding of a person with intent to obstructing
the entrance without permit into the territory of the Republic
or arrest or withholding of an alien against whom actions
were taken with intent to deport or extradite or arrest or
withholding a citizen of the Republic in order to extradite or
surrender him, having in mind the reservations of the
following provisions:
[…]
The arrest or withholding of a citizen of the Republic with the
intention of surrendering him based on a European Arrest
Warrant is possible only with regard to facts that supervened
or actions committed after the date of accession of the
Republic into the European Union…”
The most recent case to be heard by the Supreme Court
relating to the EAW is Andersson v Attorney General, 349/08.
This case illustrates the strong commitment of the Cypriot
authorities to fulfil their EU obligations, whilst at the same
time paying due regard to the procedural safeguards.
On 1 September 2008 the Swedish authorities
transmitted to the Cypriot Police an EAW for the appellant
for her arrest and surrender in relation to her alleged
participation in criminal offences committed in Sweden.
On 8 October 2008 the appellant was arrested and
presented before the court within 24 hours. The appellant
did not consent to her surrender and a date for a hearing
was set. On 31 October 2008 the District Court of Larnaca
ordered the implementation of the EAW and the surrender
of the appellant to the Swedish authorities. At the same
time it ordered that she remain in custody until the date of
her surrender. 
The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court on
three grounds. The first was that the Swedish Public
Prosecutor of the Economic Crimes Bureau was not the
responsible authority for the issuing EAWs. This
contention was examined and rejected by the first instance
court. As noted from the translation of the EAW it is clear
that no conviction was issued against the appellant and the
surrender to the Swedish authorities was not to serve a
sentence, but as a suspect for the commitment of alleged
criminal offences for her prosecution. It was also clear
from the letter of the Swedish Central Authority to the
Cypriot Central Authority that every Public Prosecutor in
Sweden, including the Public Prosecutors in the Office of
Financial Crime, is a competent judicial authority for
issuing the EAW. For the above reasons the Supreme Court
adopted the first instance judgment.
Under the second ground it was claimed that the first
instance court relied mistakenly on the evidence which was
deposited before it at the beginning of the procedure.
However, since the issue was not raised at first instance it
could not constitute a ground of appeal. In addition it was
noted by the court that at the beginning of the first instance
procedure, a report of all the relevant documents relied
upon was presented to the appellant’s lawyer who did not
object nor raise any issue of unconstitutionality.
The third ground for appeal was that the first instance
court mistakenly rejected the medical evidence. On this 5
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issue the court noted that it was connected to the EAW
procedure, but with the suspension of the execution of the
judgment. This falls under Article 29(3) of Law 133(pi ) of
2004, according to which the decision to implement an
EAW can be suspended for serious humanitarian reasons
or if it is believed that the implementation might endanger
the life or the health of the requested person. Accordingly
a written submission should be made to the Central
Authority, which will inform the judicial authorities so a
new date for surrender can be fixed. Within the above
framework the court held that this ground of the appeal
was not related to the substance of the validity of the first
instance judgment. Under the circumstances the appeal
was dismissed.
The constitutional amendment which now permits the
surrender of Cypriot nationals under an EAW is still
problematic with regards to the limitation that they will
only be surrendered for crimes committed after Cyprus’
accession on 1 May 2004. As stated in the evaluation
report, this is a clear violation of Article 32 of the Decision
which provides:
Extradition requests received before 1 January 2004 will
continue to be governed by existing instruments relating to
extradition. Requests received after that date will be governed
by the rules adopted by Member States pursuant to this
Framework Decision. However, any Member State may, at the
time of the adoption of this Framework Decision by the
Council, make a statement indicating that as executing
Member State it will continue to deal with requests relating to
acts committed before a date which it specifies in accordance
with the extradition system applicable before 1 January 2004.
The date in question may not be later than 7 August 2002.
This limitation is likely to cause frustration amongst
requesting states and in particular once the SIS is in place
with its several thousand requests, many dating before May
2004. Cyprus’s view is that to have otherwise would violate
the non-retroactivity principle. This is however not
accepted in the evaluation report as a valid ground since
they regard the retroactivity rule as applying only to
substantive criminal law and not procedural law. Further,
this clause in is contradiction with the constitution itself
which clearly states that EU law is supreme. If not
amended before hand, this constitutional conflict will need
to be resolved by the judges. 
On the basis of the information submitted to the
Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters
(Experts on the European Arrest Warrant – most recent
11 June 2008, 10330/08 COPEN 116 EJN 44
EUROJUST 58), it appears that there are no major
problems with the application of the EAW in Cyprus. The
domestic procedures are in place to facilitate the smooth
and efficient running of both incoming and out going
requests, with the key actors working well together to
facilitate the execution of requests. From all accounts the
surrender procedure occurs within the time limit set by
Article 17 (4) and Article 23 (2) of the Framework
Decision. This is no doubt facilitated by the relatively small
population and small number of EAWs it has to deal with. 
On the other hand the very procedural approach
adopted by the authorities is detrimental to at the spirit of
mutual recognition. In particular this can be seen by the
minimalist involvement of the judiciary in the whole
process. In addition to efficient procedures, mutual trust
amongst the judiciary is key to the strengthening of mutual
recognition and the successful evolution cross-border
cooperation. 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS IN PRACTICE
Cyprus views the EU as a route guaranteeing stability,
democracy and peace on the island (see for example A
Theophanous, “Prospects for solving the Cyprus problem
and the role of the European Union,’ Publius, 2000, pp
217-46). As a result, Cypriots are aware of EU matters.
Policy makers have a clear picture about the principle of
mutual recognition. It is understood as a principle designed
to strengthen cooperation between member states. More
specifically, it is understood that once a judgment is
delivered in one Member State it is not open to challenge in
another Member State but it is recognised and executed. In
that sense mutual recognition of decisions contributes to
legal certainty in the European Union. It is also understood
that implementation of the principle of mutual recognition
of decisions in criminal matters presupposes that member
states have trust in each others’ criminal justice systems.
Policy makers are familiar with the principle of mutual
recognition as introduced in the Framework Decision on
the European arrest warrant, Framework Decision on the
transfer of prisoners, Framework Decision on alternative
sanctions and Framework Decision on judgments in
absentia. Practitioners are not involved in negotiations
phase, which is conducted primarily by the Law Office of
the Republic of Cyprus and the Ministry of Justice.  
Practitioners who deal with mutual recognition cases
before the national courts have a clear picture of the
principle of mutual recognition. Dual criminality and
territoriality seem to apply as provided for in the
instruments of mutual recognition. No problems have
surfaced relating to co-operation between Member States,
as there is no jurisprudence related to dual criminality and
territoriality.
However, the non-participation of practitioners in
negotiations or in the drafting of national implementing
legislation leads to a lack of awareness of debate in the field
of judicial co-operation in criminal matters and more
specifically the mutual recognition instruments. The
problem is accentuated by the lack of training in the field
for practitioners: so far only two seminars have been
organised by TAIEX in Cyprus. Moreover, there is no
feedback mechanism on the results of mutual recognition6
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in practice post facto, and  no forum for discussion of
experiences, problems encountered and the resolution of
those problems. There is no record of individual cases
decided upon on the basis of mutual recognition, and no
relevant statistics are available.
MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN CRIMINAL
MATTERS: THE FUTURE
General
The future of mutual recognition is not easy to foresee.
By definition, the principle seems to be plagued by the
fragmentation of EU criminal law, the fluidity of criminal
law bodies and agencies, the overlap of such agencies
promoting cooperation in criminal issues, and the
conflicting interests of Member States some of which
support further integration whereas others reject the whole
idea altogether. In fact, for some the problem is a reflection
of the view that the inclusion of new members, some of
which have only limited experience with pluralistic
democracy makes some Community Member States query
whether the Council continues to be the most appropriate
forum for the development of instruments promoting
international cooperation in criminal matters. 
As regards practical measures (measures to support and
facilitate mutual recognition) in the field of judicial co-
operation, there is much more that can be done now to
enhance standards. This can be done by promoting good
practice and EU funding in areas such as recording police
suspect interviews, letters of rights, and the use of
technology (eg video conferencing in cross border cases for
obtaining evidence or interpretation). Further, given the
linguistic challenges all national criminal justice systems
face in consequence of free movement, consideration
could be given, for example, to an EU telephone number
anyone caught up in criminal proceedings could ring if they
needed immediate interpretation help.
Although approximation of laws (substantive or
procedural) cannot be viewed as a necessary prerequisite
for further cooperation based on mutual recognition, there
is support in the strengthening of citizen’s procedural
rights. This can be achieved without harmonisation of
national criminal procedures.
The European Arrest Warrant
A welcome development which can only enhance the
understanding and practice of mutual recognition would be
a declaration under Article 36 of the EU Treaty which would
allow the Cypriot courts to submit preliminary rulings to the
European Court of Justice regarding interpretation of third
pillar instruments, including the EAW decision.
The requirement to obtain a domestic warrant in
addition to the existing EAW is a step which can be safely
and legally abolished on the basis of the EAW Decision and
Law as well as the constitution which only requires a
“judicial warrant.” It will also be at odds with the
requirement for immediate arrest under the SIS. 
The evaluation report has greatest praise for the
efficiency of the mechanism in place and for the
professionalism of the authorities. Nevertheless, the very
procedural obedience to the Decision without appreciation
of the wider European framework together with the
consideration of the EAW and not as part of the wider
principle of mutual recognition, evidenced by the limited
judicial role is not healthy. As previously stated, the mutual
trust principle is a foundation of the EU criminal justice
system and the promotion of judicial cooperation. In the
interests of the future of mutual recognition, for which
there is no question of Cyprus’ positive sentiments, the
Central Authority needs to take a step back and allow
judges to step up to their role as envisaged in the Decision. 
• The views presented in this article are personal and can
only be attributed to the authors in their personal
capacity. They do not reflect, express or bind the views
of the Republic of Cyprus. 
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